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Abstract The paper discusses business impact analysis in the context of resilient
communication networks. It is based on the total (aggregated) penalty that may be
paid by an operator when the services (identified with transport demands) provided
are interrupted due to network failures. The level of penalty is expressed as a
commonly accepted business risk measure, Value-at-Risk (VaR). First, the main
concern over VaR, namely the theoretical lack of subadditivity, is discussed. The
study shows that, in practice, disadvantages do not appear in resilient network
design, and VaR can be used without the need to apply more complex and less
informative measures. Second, a method for calculating the upper bound of the total
penalty is presented. The assessment is performed for unprotected and protected
services with a broad variety of compensation policies used to translate technical
loss to monetarily expressed penalty. The proposed bounds are experimentally
shown to be effective in comparison with alternative calculation methods, and also
in the case when some of the assumptions taken during the modelling stage are not
met.
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1 Introduction
Random failures, such as link cuts or hardware faults, are destructive to networks,
both from a technical and business viewpoint. Penalties can be imposed on
operators due to breach of Service Level Agreements (SLAs). To counteract these
problems, risk management is defined as ‘‘coordinated activities to direct and
control an organization in response to risk’’ [1].
With the recent ‘beyond connectivity’ trend [2]—where the main concern is to
focus on the entire communication service—interest in network risk management
has increased. In order to deal with failures from the risk management viewpoint, it
is necessary to address the parameters such as: probability of adverse events, and
the loss (impact) incurred by them. The latter is here related to penalties paid to
clients affected by failures.
If risk is dealt with using the methodological approach, it is exercised within the
cyclic risk management framework [3]. The simplified structure of this kind
consists of the following steps: (1) risk assessment, (2) planning the risk response,
(3) response deployment, and (4) risk monitoring. Risk assessment consists of:
(a) risk analysis, identifying failure scenarios, and (b) risk evaluation determining
their probability and impact on business goals. Here we use probabilistic risk
assessment, during which both parameters are expressed mathematically [4].
Although in this paper we focus on risk evaluation alone, we also outline shortly
other phases of the cycle. Designers of resilient networks are typically most familiar
with the risk response stage, since the task of the technician is to prepare response
strategies. The manager of the service provider then decides which one to choose. In
resilient networks, the basic approach is risk mitigation that involves decrease of the
impact. In practice, mitigation uses combination of resilience procedures [5]. In this
case, response deployment embraces the configuration of resources and testing. The
next step, risk monitoring, includes: (a) continuous risk monitoring, where risks are
observed in order to identify new ones, and (b) response monitoring, performed to
check if the implemented response meets the intended goals.
A current practice of dealing with failures in design and management of resilient
networks is based on measuring failure risk with purely technical methods. These
methods apply steady-state availability or mean downtime as risk measures.
However, they are not relevant in a business context. Firstly, it is more important to
express the consequence of failures in monetary terms. Secondly, businesses may be
more interested in the variability of loss rather than its mean value, which does not
usually capture changes in network behaviour. Here, we use our previous works on
the shift of interest in resilient networks design [5–7] as a basis. There, we discuss
using business-related risk measures, such as Value-at-Risk (VaR). This measure is
already being used in communication network failure descriptions [8], and security
management [9]. Nevertheless, recurrent reservations exist about the fact that in the
financial sector VaR is known to be misleading, due to its lack of the property
known as subadditivity. As such, it is postulated to investigate more complex
measures. The aim of this paper is first to show that these disadvantages do not
appear if VaR is used to assess risk related to random network failures. We show
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that only extremely atypical network characteristics, not met in practice, can disrupt
the usefulness of VaR. Further, we provide a computationally effective method for
estimating the level of penalties with this metric.
From the viewpoint of pay-offs, our results ensure: (a) effective quantification of
total penalties imposed on a network operator due to failure presence, and thus
(b) opening of a broad range of possible risk response methods based on VaR and
elaborated in the financial field. The former enables an operator to save money in
comparison with using a simple addition of risk measures calculated for a single
service. Such an approach takes advantage of the diversification typical for
investing [10]. The proposed estimation method is based on offline calculations,
thus making them easier, more robust and less draining than simulations. The model
calculates the penalties for both unprotected and protected connections. Our approach
deals with a broad range of mappings between technical loss and business impact.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. First, we discuss related work
in Sect. 2. In Sect. 3, we focus on various methods of expressing the monetary
impact of failures (compensation policies) and methods for meaningful quantifi-
cation of the predicted financial losses (risk measures). The section also discusses
the known reservations concerning the main financial risk measure. In Sect. 4, we
elaborate on an effective method for quantifying the upper bounds on this measure
in the context of transport network services. This is the main contribution of our
paper, and we show how to find the bounds for various compensation policies
effectively. Then, we present numerical results confirming validity of our statements
and models. In Sect. 5.1, we show that from a practical viewpoint the mentioned
concerns on lack of subadditivity are not relevant in resilient network design, and
thus it is possible to use VaR with all its advantages. In Sect. 5.2, we present the
results of a very broad numerical study proving that the provided models for bounds
of VaR are indeed exact. The final section concludes our work and shows avenues
for future research.
2 Related Work
Franke [11] notes that the discussion of the relationship between the technical
aspect and the business context related to network management is poorly developed.
Our paper is presented in order to change this and boost work towards the goal of
efficiently interfacing the technology and business worlds. While the methods and
protocols for network resilience, described for instance in [12, 13], are not a new
topic, many problems remain in a business-oriented approach to resilient network
design and management. Historically, in the communications sector, risk has been
dealt with for example in: (a) selection of new investment [14], (b) security against
faults generated by malicious behaviour [15–18], or (c) quantification of deviations
from the desired quality levels [19]. Risk assessment is the most popular concern
researched in these contexts. While Value-at-Risk was postulated to be used in
communications networks for risk quantification in network security [20, 21] and
resilience [8, 9], there are no efficient theoretical models to predict VaR when it is
applied in network resilience. At the modelling level, we use some elements of the
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methodology similar to more recent works on network reliability, such as [22–25],
yet we also deal with the modelling of whole distributions, and we add penalty [26],
SLA [27, 28], and compensation policy [8] concerns.
Our numerical study is based on the distributions of failure and recovery times
reported in literature. The relevant bibliography is reviewed and commented on in
the context of risk engineering in [29]. Extensive studies of failure and recovery
times related to operational networks have been performed and reported for the
Sprint network [30], the Finnish research network [31], and the Norwegian
university network [32]. Generally, a typical approach in numerical studies is to
assume that the failures arise due to the homogeneous Poisson process. This means
that times between failures are exponentially distributed. This classical approach
seems to be statistically valid for many cases in communications [32, 33]. Other
distributions for failure times, or their approximations by times between consecutive
failures, are also occasionally reported (e.g., Weibull distribution [30]), although
they cannot be responsible for generating heavy tails in the loss distributions.
Modelling of downtimes (repair or recovery times) is more controversial. While the
simplest approach also uses exponential times, recovery times in real networks
appear to be log-normal [34] or Pareto-like—but always having mean value [31,
33].
This contribution can be treated as an extension of the two previously published
papers [6, 7]. The new contribution can be summarized as follows: (1) The first
paper [6] elaborates on the issue of lack of subadditivity of VaR, and shows that this
risk measure can be successfully used in communications since lack of subadditivity
is not a concern in practice. Here, we extend the set of the numerical studies to
confirm this statement, especially by broadening the set of investigated distributions
and taking into account node failures. Therefore, while the final statement is the
same, now we increase the confidence on validity of this statement. (2) As the main
contribution of this paper, we conceive the extension of [7], where the model for
finding the upper bound on risk measures related to random failures in
communication networks is presented. Our extension presented here is considerable:
(a) we have extended the set of compensation policies to the ones that are more
realistic than the ones shown in [7]; (b) while [7] uses a simple model based on
results elaborated in a seminal work [35], here we present a more general model
based on results derived in [36]; (c) the presented numerical studies are much
broader than the ones presented before.
3 Business-Related Risk Assessment
SLA defines the desired values of parameters related to the services provided. These
parameters include non-functional properties, such as reliability in the presence of
network failures, the maximum acceptable downtime, or interval availability for a
period of time [27, 37]. Penalties for not meeting these requirements may also be
agreed and form the basis for calculating monetary impact to quantify business
risk [26].
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3.1 Compensation Policies
The way a penalty is defined as a function of the technical reliability parameter is
known as the compensation policy [38]. Basically, if an outage appears and lasts for
period of time s, we can model p—the penalty (outage cost) for this single outage. It
is as a general function of s: p ¼ f ðsÞ. To find p, we follow the basic compensation
options considered in [11, 38]. All of them are represented by convex functions.
They are illustrated in Fig. 1.
It is possible to base the compensation policy on the number of all outages
perceptible at the service level over a given interval. This means that the emphasis is
put on the service continuity. This concerns services such as very short
communication connection or sensitive data for real-time traffic control. Such
services are rendered useless, no matter how brief outages are or how fast the
resilience procedure is. We call such a policy Cont. For it, we may assume the
fixed penalty independent of the outage time s:
pCont ¼ wf : ð1Þ
Another compensation policy is to assume that the penalty is proportional to the
downtime [39], i.e., the amount of time when the service is not operational. If the
penalty is proportional to this time, this policy can be expressed by the so-called
interval unavailability, the fraction of time when the service is not operating [40].
As this measure is a probabilistic complement to a better known availability, we call
this policy Avail. This type of policy is most suitable for long-lasting services for
elastic traffic, such as data transmission, web browsing, e-mail, and is typically
agreed with individual customers. This reference policy based on the downtime s
can then be expressed as:
pAvail ¼ wis: ð2Þ
The Cont and Avail policies can be combined arbitrarily. In the simplest case,
we can use the fixed restart policy (FixedRestart), where additionally to the
linear penalty due to the outage time, a fixed penalty Tthr for each outage is added:
pFixedRestart ¼ wiðsþ TthrÞ: ð3Þ









Fig. 1 Compensation policies considered in the proposed model
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To make things more complex, but close to reality, it can be assumed that the
penalty is based on the number of outages exceeding a selected downtime
threshold [41]. A practical example of this policy can be seen for SLAs related to
Amazon S3, an online storage service.1 Such a policy is valid when the agreement
predicts the value of the Recovery Time Objective (RTO) beyond which the client
can be sure that the failure will inflict some harm. This is a typical approach in
business continuity planning [42].
Additionally, the penalty may not be scaled proportionally over a period of
outage [43]. For instance, the so-called snowball effect [11] can be modelled by a
compensation policy, where a strongly non-linear function explicitly shows the
penalizing effect of a large value of the cumulative downtime or a number of
outages. Such an approach may be especially relevant for relatively short services
carrying sensitive data tolerating only short outages, such as transfers with advance
reservation (e.g., in grid networks) or traffic with strict response limits. In our work,




where long downtimes are penalized considerably, while for the downtimes smaller
than Tthr the penalty is sub-linear (or even negligible). For given values wi and Tthr,
the outage cost for s ¼ Tthr is assumed to be the same in the cases of the Avail and
Snowball policies. Hence, we obtain a form of ‘normalization’ of penalty values,
as can be seen in Fig. 1.
3.2 Probabilistic Risk Measures
The values of penalties defined on the basis of a given compensation policy are
random in a given time interval. To define meaningful quantification on their basis,
so-called probabilistic risk measures are used. From the risk evaluation viewpoint,
in the best case scenario the full probability distribution function (PDF) of the
impact expressed in monetary units can be found. For a given PDF of the penalty,
point estimates are applied [44]. The popular mean value of the penalty
distribution [45, 46] has been found to be insufficient. The reason is its inability
to quantify extreme values, characteristic of dealing with the risk context. Instead,
the main measure used by finance departments to quantify the level of investment is
Value-at-Risk, VaR. The definition is as follows [47, 48]: VaRg is a quantile
measure, and it provides for a selected level of probability g the value of penalty
that can appear. Let n be the level of penalties to be paid in an interval. If PnðxÞ ¼
Prfn xg is the cumulative distribution function of n, the Value-at-Risk is defined
as the maximum penalty with a given confidence level g:
VaRg ¼ inf x : Prfn xg gf g ¼ P1n ðgÞ: ð5Þ
1 According to the most recent Amazon S3 Service Level Agreement (version: September 16, 2015;
source: https://aws.amazon.com/s3/sla/), the outage starts to be counted if the requests are not responded
for no less than 5 min.
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This measure is now widely used in the banking sector to assess the obligatory level
of savings. Additionally, it has been suggested that it is introduced in network
design [8, 9, 29, 49, 50]. In response to some disadvantages of VaR, especially the
lack of subadditivity (see Sect. 3.3 below), the derivative measures were proposed.
However, although new methods for their efficient assessment have recently
appeared [51, 52], in many cases their values are still at least one level of magnitude
higher [6]. Thus, they cannot be treated as an efficient basis for investments and
network design decisions.
3.3 Concerns about Subadditivity of VaR
There are some postulates to characterize coherent (desirable) risk measures [53].
One property is especially problematic when dealing with VaR. The property is










where q represents the measure of risk for items xi, e.g., services.
Subadditivity has the following positive consequences. (1) Quantification of risk
measures is easier during the risk evaluation phase, where risk aggregation
(calculation of the overall risk from individual risks) is conducted. In the case of
subadditive measures, it is possible to easily assess the upper bound of risk. (2)
Portfolio diversification, justifying good practice to provide service differentiation,
is advantageous in comparison to separate investments [54]. (3) Avoiding or
mitigating the risks related to the greatest levels of impact is the best option to deal
with risk response [9]. (4) Subadditivity is a necessary condition to ensure the
convexity of the risk measure. Then, efficient linear programming-based methods
inspired by portfolio optimization approaches [44, 55] become feasible during
network design.
A lack of subadditivity does not only mean that the above advantages are not
present, but also that there is a very important danger related to using such a risk
measure. It is believed that one of the roots of the banking crisis in 2008 was related
to improper assessment of credit risks [56], i.e., based on VaR. The problem is that
the used method is very sensitive to heavy tails in the PDFs of the impact. This
sensitivity is the result of a lack of subadditivity. While it is common practice in the
investment sector to base the VaR-related calculations on normal distributions [57],
this is not always justified. These arguments against VaR are repeated in risk studies.
Hence, we decided to verify whether lack of subadditivity is a real danger in
resilient networks. This is done by numerical simulations in Sect. 5.1 and the results
are very optimistic. Therefore, we assume to be able to use this risk measure without
dangers.
The next part of the paper, then, focuses on the main contribution, which is an
efficient modelling of VaR in resilient networks.
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4 Probabilistic Assessment of Aggregated Risk (Total Penalty)
Here, we assess the value of a risk measure for the total penalty paid by the network
operator during a given time interval. One could think of a simple method of
calculating the total penalty by calculating risk measure values for single services
and then adding the results to obtain the aggregated risk measure related to the
whole portfolio of services. This is not the best method, since it may provide an
over-optimistic bound in the case of VaR, which is not subadditive. Additionally,
even if subadditivity is observed as shown in Sect. 5.1, the bound obtained in this
manner may be too pessimistic. This phenomenon is also noted later in our
numerical results presented in Sect. 5.2. Therefore, we need an effective method of
providing an upper bound for aggregated risk.
The following mathematical framework enables us to express the compensation
policy if it is consistent among all the services. A network is represented by a graph
(V, E), where V is a set of nodes, and E is a set of links connecting the nodes. V [ E
is the set of network components. All of them are unreliable, which means they may
fail and be repaired. Hence, we associate two probability distribution functions with
each unreliable element: (a) the first describes time between failures and (b) the
second concerns downtimes. While we use various types of time distributions
(exponential, Weibull, Pareto, and log-normal), at some stage of the modelling we
need to determine the failure (kc) and repair (lc) rates for each unreliable network
component c 2 ðV [ EÞ. All the failure and repair processes are assumed to be
independent of each other. Each service d is modelled at the physical level as a
transfer service between two different nodes using a connection made of an n-tuple
of links and nodes. The algorithm follows the steps given below:
1. Before we start preparing an exact model of risk, we need to assign
compensation policies to determine penalties for each service. We also assume
that each service is given a pre-determined primary path, and a backup path if
the dedicated protection case is modelled. That is, we do not bother about the
routing which is treated as an input to our algorithm.
2. Then, the continuous-time Markov chain (CTMC) for each service is
constructed. Means and variances of compensation policy-related penalty
values for all the services are found using these Markov chains. This makes it
possible to find the mean and variance of the total aggregated penalty (pTotal)
over the interval.
3. Finally, the whole distribution of the aggregated penalty parameterized by these
two values is found. We use one of the elliptical distributions. We found that,
typically, the log-normal distribution gives the best fit results. When the whole
risk distribution is parameterized, it becomes possible to find its quantiles,
including VaR.
The different elements of this scheme are described below.
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4.1 General Case
To quantify a quantile risk measure (such as VaR), we need to estimate a full
probability distribution function for the penalty over a given time interval (typically
per annum). We need to evaluate this value on the basis of the penalties calculated
for separate services instead of modelling the level of penalties for the whole
network, which would be a very complex task. The individual penalties related to
various services are correlated because a failure of one component can affect many
services. To estimate the level of the total penalty pTotal, we want to use the worst
case approximation (the upper bound) for finding covariances between penalties
calculated for various services.
First, let X ¼ ½X1; . . .;Xd; . . . be the random vector of penalties for each service






Then, let NdðtÞ denote the number of outages that happen to service d during the
observation interval t. And let pd denote the single penalty (for a single outage)
related to this service. The modelling of various types of penalties related to
different compensation policies, and methods of finding penalty values, are
discussed in Sect. 3.1. The penalty related to each service can be found as a random
sum of individual penalties related to this service (i.e., for various outages). If we
assume that the means and variances of NdðtÞ and pd are known, we can use basic
probabilistic rules to find the average value of the total penalty over an interval for a
service as:
E½Xd ¼ E½NdðtÞE½pd; ð8Þ
and its variance as:
D2½Xd ¼ E½NdðtÞD2½pd þ E2½pdD2½NdðtÞ: ð9Þ
Then, the average value of the total penalty can be found with the vector of
average values of the penalties E½X ¼ ½E½X1; . . .; E½Xd; . . . as:
E½pTotal ¼ E½X1T ; ð10Þ
where 1 is the vector of ones ½1; 1; . . .; 1 of the appropriate dimension (here, of
length equal to the number of services). The variance of the whole penalty is found
with the help of the covariance matrix of X:
D2½pTotal ¼ 1TCovðXÞ1: ð11Þ
Finally, these values are used to find the parameters of an elliptical distribution
being the distribution of a total sum of penalties, or a distribution close to it—for an
explanation, see [35]. In our case, this is the log-normal distribution. On the basis of
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this distribution, we are finally able to find the quantile risk measures. However, the
problem is finding the values for parameterization. As exact calculation is too
complex in practice, here we present the upper bound of the distribution to
effectively obtain the values.
4.2 Unprotected Case
To show the idea of upper bounding, let us begin with a simple example of a service
supported by an unprotected connection. Such a connection can be treated as a
series reliability structure that fails when there is a fault in at least one of its
elements. To consider the correlation between the events, let us consider two
services di and dj, each with its own SLA inducing specific penalty values. In our
model each service uses the same type of compensation policy, although the related
weights differ. For two services di; dj, we define the following partition for three sets
of all the components of the carrying connections (see Fig. 2): mi ¼ fc : c 2 di
^c 62 djg, mj ¼ fc : c 62 di ^ c 2 djg, and mij ¼ fc : c 2 di ^ c 2 djg. We call these
sets ‘macrocomponents’. If we find the respective penalties Xdi and Xdj for the
services di and dj, the following bounds hold:
Xdi Xmij þ Xmi ;
Xdj Xmij þ Xmj ;
ð12Þ
where Xmij is the penalty calculated for the service consisting of macrocomponent
mij, the case when di and dj were simultaneously down. Xmi and Xmj are the penalties
found for the virtual services consisting of macrocomponents mi and mj, respec-
tively. The given inequalities come from the fact that there can be simultaneous
failures in mi and mij. Additionally, we were able to formulate these inequalities for
penalties, while in fact they hold for outage times. However, on the basis of Jensen’s
inequality we know that Eq. (12) are true, due to the fact that we use convex penalty
functions. Then, using basic probabilistic rules, it is easy to show that for the upper
bounds we have:
Cov½Xdi ;Xdj  ¼ D2½Xmij  ð13Þ
if only Xmij , Xmi , and Xmj are independent.
c1 c3 c9 c11 c17 c19














mi = {c1,c2,c3 ,c4,c8,c9,c10,c11,c12 ,c16,c17,c18,c19}
mj = {c20,c21,c22,c23,c24,c25,c26,c27,c28,c29,c30,c31,c32}
mi j = {c5,c6,c7,c13,c14,c15}
Fig. 2 Illustration of partitioning to macrocomponents for connections supporting two unprotected
services di; dj
500 J Netw Syst Manage (2016) 24:491–515
123
We can treat a macrocomponent as just an ensemble of independent ON-OFF
components. As such, it can be modelled as a single ON-OFF system itself.
However, the general modelling of such an ensemble on the basis of the behaviour
of a single element is not possible unless the uptimes and downtimes are assumed to
be exponentially distributed. Hence, each component and the entire ensemble can be
modelled as a CTMC. Then, it is possible to find the analytical bound for the risk
measures. In practice, network failures arrive according to a Poisson process [31].
This is a common assumption taken while the mathematical modelling of failures is
performed. In our numerical studies shown in Sect. 5.2, we challenge this
assumption and show that our model also provides useful results when the failure
process is not memoryless.
Let the state of a single component be modelled as a CTMC on the state space
f0; 1g with failure rate ki and repair rate li. The state of the macrocomponent being
an ensemble of n independent components is a CTMC on the state space f0; 1gn
with an infinitesimal generator matrix:
Q ¼an
i¼1Qi ð14Þ






anda denotes the Kronecker sum. The above follows directly from the properties
of the Kronecker product [59] and the independence of individual components.
Then, we are able to find the bound related to Eq. (13).
As a macrocomponent is a series reliability structure, we are able to define only
ensemble modelling CTMC, where all the components operate. Therefore, the time
the system spends in the up-state (U) is exponentially distributed with the rate being
equal to the sum of failure rates of all the components. On the other hand, the
distribution of downtimes is more difficult to compute. We use the embedded
Markov chain and the Laplace transform to find a good approximation for the mean
and variance of the time the system spends in the down-state (D). Let us begin with
a fully operational macrocomponent (all up-states). Next, a component fails after an
exponentially distributed time. In the next Markov chain jump, the failure may be
repaired or another failure may occur. The time elapsed before the next event is
again exponentially distributed, with the rate parameter dependent on the current
state. Applying the total probability formula to the number of failures, the
distribution of D can be expressed as an infinite sum of convolutions. In the Laplace
transform domain, convolutions become multiplications, and the first and second
raw moment of the distribution can be derived from the derivative of the
transform [58]. Finally, since the probability of simultaneous multiple failures is
extremely low, the infinite series can be approximated by the first few terms, where
in practice the first two to three terms are sufficient. This truncation simply omits
possibility of triple, quadruple, or more simultaneous failures.
Below, we generalize the case of an unprotected connection outlined above to the
case when the service can be supported by a more complex connection, especially
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applying alternative connections for dedicated protection. Then, we expand the
concept of a macrocomponent and relate it to the probability process state. The
generalization is necessary since the model given in Eq. (14) is prone to the state
space explosion. Despite the current computational power offered by an efficient
sparse matrix implementation (as available in MATLAB, for instance), it is
necessary to reduce the complexity of the model by redefining the state space.
4.3 Generalized Markov-Based Modelling of Penalties





where Ckn is a set of all k-element combinations out of all n unreliable network
components related to a given service (i.e., we deal with the components forming
the working path for unprotected connection or a pair of paths for the protected
case). And M is the arbitrary selected number of probable simultaneous failures in
the network. In practice, we can assume that M 3 is sufficient, and the dimension
of the state space is reduced from 2n to a number  nM . Note that for M ¼ n, both
spaces (i.e., the one defined here as a generalization and the one related to Eq. (14)
shown for the unprotected case in Sect. 4.2) are isomorphic. The new representation
allows us to cut off configurations with extremely low probabilities by reordering
original states. Here, we rely on the simple fact that having three, four or more
simultaneous failures in a network is extremely unlikely. The infinitesimal generator
of the process is a sparse matrix containing the entries of the following form (see

























Fig. 3 An example of the CTMC when there are three (n ¼ 3) components in the network; we assume
that there are no more than two faulty (M ¼ 2) elements at a time. ki: failure rate of element i; lj: repair
rate of element j
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8i6¼j Qij ¼
kk if sj ¼ si [ fkg





; si; sj 2 S: ð17Þ





Note that since the state space is reduced in comparison to the full space related to
Eq. (14), the exact formulas can be used instead of approximations proposed in [7]
on the basis of the results found by Taka´cs [35].
Now, for each service di we define only a pair of macrocomponents ðUi;DiÞ
constituting the partitioning of the whole set of states: S ¼ Ui [ Si, Ui \ Si ¼£. In
some states Ui  S, the service di works, while in others summarized as Di ¼ SnUi
this service is down. Note that the selection of ðUi;DiÞ is unique for each service di.
For instance, this is the case of an unprotected connection service, Ui ¼ fS0g, where
S0 is the only state where all the components c 2 di work properly. However, we
keep this derivation general, so it remains useful for the dedicated protection case.
In the latter case, Ui is the set of all states in which all the components of the
primary path or all the components of the backup path are operational.
The calculation of the downtime of a macrocomponent simply involves solving
the first passage time problem in CTMC, that is the amount of time it takes for the
Markov process to reach the absorbing state from the initial totally faultless
state [36] (that is, the time it takes for a system to jump out of Ui to Di). Although
we use the CTMC, meaning the times between changing the various states are
exponential, the overall passage time it takes to reach the macrocomponent Di from
Ui is not exponential. Therefore, if we wish to describe the state of the service on
state space f0; 1g (0: the whole service is operational, 1: the service is faulty), we
need to use a semi-Markov process with phase-type distributed sojourn times, which
are the times the underlying CTMC spends in a groups of states Ui and Di.
In order to find the distribution of sojourn times in Ui 2 S, the states Di ¼ SnUi
are assumed to be absorbing and the general formula for the passage time is found
on the basis of the moments of time distribution, using the Laplace transform. It is
found by rearranging the generator Q defined by Eqs. (17)–(18). We know that it is
possible to partition Q to the following submatrices [36]:
ð19Þ
The partitioning assumes the following state reordering: Ui is formed of the first r
states. The values in the square matrix rjUij	jUij are related to the transitions between
all the states in Ui. Bearing this in mind, the matrices TjDij	jDij (gathering data about
transition rates inside the Di macrocomponent) and qjDij	jUij (gathering data about
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transition rates between the states from various macrocomponents) are found in a
unique way.
Now, the Laplace transform of the first passage time can be expressed as
follows [36]:
LðzÞ ¼ PinðzI  TÞ1r1; ð20Þ
where z is the complex variable defined for the Laplace transform, and I is the
identity matrix of the proper dimension. Additionally, Pin is the distribution of the
initial state of service di: if Ui 6¼ fS0g, there are different starting points in Ui as
well as in Di, distributed according to Pin. Since we are interested in distributions of
the states upon the state change, we approximate Pin by the stationary distribution of
the embedded Markov chain of Q conditioned on being in the selected state subset
Ui. This way, we avoid solving differential equations to find the exact form of Pin.
Now we are able to find the aggregated penalty values when various
compensation policies are used. First, consider the raw moment of the distribution
of the total penalty p ¼ f ðsÞ. By using the approximation of f with the Taylor series,
the moments can be expressed in terms of the raw moments of the distribution of
outage time s. The ith moment of the s distribution, denoted as mn, can be found as
follows [36]:
mn ¼ ð1Þnþ1n!PinTðnþ1Þr1 ð21Þ
In this way, we can obtain values for non-linear compensation policies. For





The equation is obtained from the mean value of the penalty defined in Eq. (4),
where the mean is the first moment m1. It is then possible to replace the outage time
s value by its moment calculated on the basis of Eq. (21). Similarly, using the






Here, we take advantage of the fact that the fourth moment of a random variable is
the second moment of its square.
4.4 Dedicated Protection Case
As stated, the concept of macrocomponents is useful for the unprotected case.
However, in the case of dedicated protection, macrocomponents—as understood
according to the definition in Sect. 4.2—are coupled and cannot be modelled
independently. State subsets Ui and Di, defined as macrocomponents in Sect. 4.3,
cannot be constructed from the common macrocomponent only. Then, the system of
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the working and backup paths has to be modelled as one, and appropriate states are
selected for Di. Moments of the distribution of the number of faults of a service over
an observation interval tmax (NdðtmaxÞ) must be calculated from the moments of a
distribution of the passage time (i.e., the time to hit the set Di), since the stream of
failure events observed by the service d does not form a Poisson process. Then, they











where moni is the ith moment of the up-time of the connection supporting service di.
When it comes to covariance in the case of dedicated protection, it becomes even
more complicated, since the system is constructed from four paths (i.e., two primary
and two backup paths). In such a system, the new subsets for services di and dj are
selected as follows: Ddij ¼ Di \ Dj and Udij ¼ SnDdij . Then, it holds that:
Cov½Xdi ;Xdj  ¼ D2½Xdij ; ð26Þ
where Xdij is the penalty computed for the set of states Ddij . The reasoning is the
same as that presented in relation to Eq. (13).
5 Numerical Studies
First, we would like to show that in practical cases, VaR behaves as if it was
subadditive. We will show that the lack of subadditivity is seen only for the
stochastic parameters that are not met in reality in networks. Next, we show that the
theoretical model for risk assessment gives a very good bound.2 The numerical
examples are constructed as follows. The network topologies used are retrieved
from the SNDlib library (http://sndlib.zib.de) [60] and model two large networks:
the compact and dense German Research Network (nobel-germany.xml), and
the very broad yet sparse US Network (nobel-us.xml). For each node and link
in a network, the interchanging failure and resilience process is modelled. In the
basic case, according to the most commonly assumed conditions, both distributions
for link/node failure times/downtimes are exponential. Their rates were taken
from [31]. We use the following function to find the failure/repair rates for links:
2 Due to the limited space, we are not able to present in this paper all the obtained results. Therefore, they
are present in the form of plots in the companion webpage: http://home.agh.edu.pl/*cholda/research/
effective-risk-assessment-with-value-at-risk/.
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k ¼ kR ^ l ¼ 1:3
2:3m
if l\25 km
k ¼ kR þ 9 kRl
lmax
^ l ¼ 1:3
2:3 mþ 9 ml
lmax





where l represents a link length expressed in kilometres (lmax is the largest link
length in a networks), and kR and m are the basic distribution parameters retrieved
from [31]. Each service has its own parameters necessary to find the exact value of
the penalty. The scaling weight wi is equal to the volume transferred by a service.
This volume is provided with the network models. The time scale Tthr is equal to the
mean downtime of the most reliable component of the network. We have checked
that scaling this value with 0.5 or 2 does not change the qualitative character of the
results. Each connection supporting a service is routed with the shortest path routing
found by the Dijkstra algorithm (our networks are modelled by weighted digraphs,
where the weights representing lengths of the links are non-negative). For each
scenario, we held 100,000 simulations developed in C??. Each simulation time
was 1 year of network operation; this is the interval for which penalties due to the
assumed compensation policies are estimated. We need this number of simulations
since the events are rare, and only with 100,000 simulations do the observed cor-
relations for two runs start to differ at the third decimal place. The mathematical
modelling is performed with the help of MATLAB.
A typical assumption made during various risk assessment calculations is that all the
failures and repairs are independent and the downtimes are exponentially distributed. We
support the former assumption. On the other hand, this is a rough estimate of the reality of
the situation. Additionally, with exponential downtimes, we cannot observe the non-
subadditive character ofVaR, since heavy tails are not present. Additionally, it has been
reported that PDFs of recovery times in networks can be heavy-tailed [30, 31, 33]. We
use such distributions (the Pareto distribution), and by changing parameters, we show
that the lack of subadditivity of VaR does appear for extremely atypical values only.





(a) unprotected service (RUP),








4. Distributions of failure times and downtimes:
(a) E: negative exponential Expk (fexpðtÞ ¼ ekt);
(b) P: Pareto Para;m (fParetoðtÞ ¼ amataþ1), note that for this distribution there is no
mean when a 1 and no variance when a 2 ½0; 2, the m parameter is
60 sec in all cases (this value stems from the granularity of router queries
sent by the Simple Network Management Protocol to check the
connectivity state in the broad numerical study shown in [31]) except




(a) the value of the aggregated risk obtained in the simulation: VaR Rð Þ,
(b) naı¨ve upper bound for aggregated risk:
P
VaR,
(c) efficient upper bound introduced by the theoretical model presented in
this paper: VaRTh.
In all the cases, g means the quantile level.
5.1 Study I: Subadditivity of Value-at-Risk is Not an Issue
The general character of the obtained results is shown in Fig. 4, grouping the three
representative cases. It is related to the US network, but the character of the results
is the same for the German network. In this figure, only the results for the Avail
compensation policy are presented, as it is most sensitive to the recovery time
distribution. In the figure we show two curves. One is related to the risk measure
calculated separately for each connection individually and summed (the naı¨ve upper
bound exceeded if the measure shows lack of sub-additivity). The other curve shows
the value of the measure calculated for the distribution of the total penalty in the
network. Figure 4a shows the situation when both failure and recovery times are
exponential, and where the character of the PDF for the penalties is convergent to
the Gaussian-, Gamma, or log-normal-like distribution, which is the result of the
fact that the cumulative downtime distribution is the convolution of exponential
times. Therefore, the subadditivity holds, and further on we do not analyze results
for exponential recovery times.
The option to show subadditivity appears only when using heavy-tailed
distributions. The second plot (Fig. 4b) shows the evident subadditivity of VaR,
even though it is related to atypical and unrealistic parameters of the Pareto
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distribution, where the penalties start to present heavy-tailed behaviour. The lack of
subadditivity is not visible until we use extremely strange parameters, as shown in
Fig. 4c. Even then, the subadditivity is present for high quantile values (e.g., 0.99)
that are commonly used by the financial sector. The measure is not subadditive for
lower quantile values, such as for 0.95 which may also be interesting in the
application context. As it cannot be seen in the figures, where we show only large
quantile values, it is also worth mentioning that the results also conform with the
theory [53] that VaRg based on the normal distribution of losses is subadditive for
values of 1  g smaller than 1
2
. And indeed, we are interested in large values of g,
which is why we study mainly quantiles for g[ 0:9.
To show how the situation changes for all the studied Pareto-based simulation
scenarios, we extended their number by changing the value of a responsible for the
existence or lack of a heavy tail. To present the results in a compact form, we
introduce the metric known as Relative Subadditivity Measure, defined as:
RSM ¼
P
VaR VaR Rð Þ
VaR Rð Þ ; ð28Þ
The non-negative values of RSM show the appearance of subadditivity. The results,
grouped in three sub-figures related to compensation policies in Fig. 5, show that



















































Fig. 4 Examples of the risk parameters quantified with VaR. Network: NUS. Resilience method: RUP.
Compensation policy: Avail. a Distr. of fail. times: Exp1=90. b Distr. of fail. times: Par3;60. c Distr. of
fail. times: Par0:9;1




























Fig. 5 Values of RSM calculated for VaR0:95 and simulation scenarios with distribution of failure times
according to: Para;60. a Comp. policy: FixedRestart. b Comp. policy: Cont. c Comp. policy:
Snowball
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only the compensation policy emulating the snowball effect may show the lack of
subadditivity. As already stated, this is only the case for highly unrealistic distri-
butions. The results for the other compensation policies are loosely independent of
the distributions. The level of subadditivity is somewhat dependent on the selected
resilience method, while here it seems that the approximation of the aggregated risk
measure by the sum of the individual risk values is better for unprotected con-
nections. For protected connections, the upper bound becomes more pessimistic.
Generally, we can see that VaR can be reliably used for assessing risk in all types of
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Fig. 6 Results comparing the exact values of aggregated risk measures and the derived upper bounds for
them when the connections are not protected. The legend presents the used distributions as (F, R), where
F represents the distribution of the time to failure, and R represents the distribution of the downtime. a
Comp. policy: FixedRestart. Network: NGe. b Comp. policy: Cont. Network: NGe. c Comp. policy:
Snowball. Network: NGe. d Comp. policy: Avail. Network: NUS. e Comp. policy: Cont. Network:
NUS. f Comp. policy: Snowball. Network: NUS
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methods, unless the behaviour of the recovery times becomes highly atypical. The
only case we can imagine, apart from wartime, is related to natural catastrophes.
However, in such an event it is doubtful whether typical business-related risk
management would be relevant at all.
5.2 Study II: Effective Upper Bounding of Risk Measures
We know that, while calculating VaR, we should not use the summation of the
values of VaR for individual services, as this measure is not subadditive in general.
And even if it happens to behave as if it was subadditive, we would like to obtain
more exact estimates. Therefore, we show that the theoretical modelling derived in
Sect. 4 provides a very good upper bound for the aggregated risk, much better than
the naı¨ve bound obtained by simply adding the risk measure values across all the
services separately.
As the Weibull distribution is treated as the most suitable to model time to
failure [30], we decided to provide the heuristic selection of the exponential
distribution to fit it. The Weibull uptime distribution is then approximated by the
exponential distribution in the following way. We consider two simple ON-OFF
systems. One with Weibull uptime distribution and exponential downtime
distribution (we call this system ‘the Weibull system’), and the second with both
exponential distributions (‘the exponential system’). The Weibull distribution is
approximated by exponential distribution such that for both systems:
mWeib þ arWeib ¼ mExp þ arExp; ð29Þ
where mWeib, mExp, rWeib, and rExp are the expected values and standard deviations
of the total downtime during tmax for the Weibull and exponential systems,
respectively. It was observed that the value a ¼ 1:2 gives quite accurate upper
bound for values related to the total penalties. We use the same simulation settings


































Fig. 7 Results comparing the exact values of aggregated risk measures and the derived upper bounds for
them when the connections use dedicated protection. Compensation policy: FixedRestart. It is
assumed that both the time to failure and downtime distributions are exponential. a Network: NGe. b
Network: NUS
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log-normal distribution of penalties (this distribution is best fitted to evaluate the tail
of the total penalty for most of the studied policies) for all the services, we are able
to calculate VaR for each of them for the following quantiles:
g ¼ 0:9; 0:95; 0:99; 0:999. However, as we are interested in the estimation of the
risk measure related to the total penalty (VaRðRÞ) that should be paid by the
operator, in Figs. 6 and 7 we do not present the values of the individual risk
measures. We only focus on showing that the proposed upper bound (VaRTh) is
much more effective than the upper bound obtained with the summation of risk
measures calculated for separate services (
PðVaRÞ). We present only the most
interesting and non-intuitively good results. For instance, the most prone to bad
bounding are the systems with the Pareto downtimes, therefore—where possible—
we show the performance for them. Due to complexity of calculations, the results
shown for protections concern only ten services with the largest values of penalties
agreed in their SLAs.
As can be seen from the figures, even if VaR in this case does not show a lack of
subadditivity (i.e. advantageous effect of diversification appears), the bounds
provided by summing the individual values of the measures are much more
pessimistic than the worst case bound we elaborated. By summing the risk measures
for the individual services, an overestimation of approximately 10 % is provided,
while our upper bound gives an almost perfect fit with an average overestimation of
only 0.10 %. Using the provided upper bound, we can estimate the exact value of
the total penalty without needing to perform a very large number of simulations for
all compensation policies. Such a large number is indispensable in order to obtain
sufficiently small confidence intervals if the total penalty is to be obtained by
simulation. The confidence intervals for quantiles diminish quite slowly, i.e., with
the speed proportional to a value between n2; n1ð Þ, where n is the number of
samples [61]. Moreover, for large values of g, if the tails of the distributions do not
decay quickly, we have to increase the number of simulations to have the
opportunity to calculate the quantiles to gather enough samples. Our approach
enables us to avoid technical problems such as this. It is noticeable that for the
Snowball compensation policy combined with the Pareto downtimes we are not
able to effectively bound the results.
5.3 Summary of the Results
We promote the usage of business-relevant risk measures in the context of resilient
networks. That is, we propose to apply the commonly accepted quantile measure
VaR, which is widely used in the investment sector to assess the obligatory level of
savings. In network design and management, this approach can be used to predict
penalties, estimate the level of the provided protection against failures, or suggest
necessary changes to the network. Nowadays, simpler measures of risk used in
network design lose information about impact variability, since they are based on
mean values. Therefore, they describe the character of the impact distribution very
roughly. On the other hand, VaR preserves the information on variability and makes
it possible to use complex portfolio optimization methods elaborated in the financial
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sector. Nevertheless, we paid attention not only to the advantages in using this
measure, but also highlighted potential drawbacks. We showed that: (1) For a broad
spectrum of distributions encountered in real networks, the VaR measure is
subadditive in practice and can be used reliably. (2) Additionally, even when we
were able to find highly unrealistic values for which the lack of subadditivity is
expressed, it was generally the case for low quantile values that are less interesting
in practical cases of risk assessment. (3) Furthermore, as the quantification of VaR
requires calculation of the whole penalty distributions, we propose a computation-
ally effective method of exact upper bounding of the total penalty to be paid by the
operator using various compensation policies encountered in practice. (4) While our
newly introduced model assumes memoryless property of the involved stochastic
processes, we show that it also performs well when challenged with various non-
exponential distributions.
6 Conclusions
With the results confirmed experimentally and summarized in the previous section,
we are providing the operators with a tool to assess the business consequences of
technical losses, which will improve SLA preparation as well as network design and
management processes. This may also be used for resilience purposes, e.g. selection
of network parts to be especially protected. The calculated values can also be used
in optimization problems, thus opening the possibility of using the methods
elaborated in modern portfolio theory.
We regard making the most of this potential as future work, where we would like
to: (1) Focus on mathematical programming-based optimization approaches that
treat connections or service classes in resilient networks as investments, and where
risk assesses either the return from selling them or the loss that is incurred when the
services are lost due to failures. (2) Extend the presented model by relaxing the
constraint on the unified type of compensation policy across all services. (3) Add
relevant modelling for the shared protections, where the backup resources are not
dedicated to selected services anymore. (4) Deal with the service which is not based
on an end-to-end (unicast) connection, but is related to a connection to a pool of
resources, where availability of only one item is sufficient to provide the service.
From data transfer viewpoint, this scheme can be perceived as related to anycast. A
practical application of this case is relevant to cloud or grid environments. While
this is a problem of utmost practical importance, the related modelling is more
complex than the one used by us in this paper. The reason for increased complexity
is that the level of the service dynamics involved is much higher and the IT
infrastructure is dependent on external resources, such as power provisioning. The
latter involves hard problems known under the name of system-of-systems
modelling.
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